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Here, we create our basic forms using 
recursion. For each of the forms along the 
left side, the column corresponds to the 
quota, and the number of boxes in the 
column represents the power of 
the player.
In this example, we will have five 
players, with weights 1, 2, 3, 4, and 
5. The final form is what it would 
look like if we added a player with 
weight 6.
Here, by duplicating and shifting forms, we expand 
our forms as more players are added.
Here’s a visual 
close-up on this 
second process.
Suppose there are three players. One player has one vote, and the 
other two players have three votes. Who has the most power, and by 
how much? This question is one focus of Voting Theory, which was the 
focus of this research project.
The answer to our question is… it depends. Suppose you need all 
seven possible votes to pass a bill. Then each player must vote for it, 
and so they all have equal power. But if all you need is six votes, then it 
doesn’t matter what our poor first player does. The only way the bill will 
pass is if players two and three want it, so the first player has no 
power.
One way to measure power is the Common Good Power Index, 
which measures power by looking at the groups of players which, 
between them, have enough votes to pass a bill, but if any left the 
group, they could no longer pass the bill. The power of a player is said 
to be the number of these groups that the player belongs to.
This poster highlights one finding of the research project. Given that 
the power of a player varies based on of the quota, I sought to 
calculate the power of each player for all possible quotas, all at once. 
Instead of more words, here’s a visual description of the result.
As an example: this column 
represents a quota of 9 (the ninth 
column) with 5 players (five rows).
We can see that Player 1 has one 
power (one block), Players 2 and 4 
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This result is a method to simply and efficiently calculate the power of a 
set of players, for any possible quota, using the Common Good Power 
Index. Instead of testing every single possible group, this method allows 
calculation using simple additive recursion.
Outside academia, this method can be utilized to efficiently calculate 
large groups of power structures, which allows for weighted voting 
systems to be constructed around the effective power of each player, 
rather than just assigning votes and testing systems individually.
This result also presents some interesting follow-up questions. Among 
them: Is it possible to create an explicit formula for a player’s power for 
one particular quota? Can this process be reversed to give certain 
players certain amounts of power? And what can we say about the 
situations where a player with more votes ends up with less power?
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